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ABSTRACT
The paper attempts to demonstrate that all of the perpetrators of
the grave terrorist attacks in Europe in the recent years have been
connected—by one or maximum two links—to the center and leadership
of ISIS in Syria, from whom they received ideological, logistical and
financial support—thus contradicting the popular theory of lone wolves.
The author reaches the conclusion that in many cases addressing potential
lone radicals on Jihadist forums before the attacks was nothing else but
a special form of Psyop, with the goal of disrupting counterrorism efforts
and spreading fear in societies.
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INTRODUCTION
The 9/11 terrorist attacks forced everyone to face the question: how
did the unthinkable happen? How could one of the most prepared
secret services in the world fail so tragically? Looking for the answer
to that question brought forward–if only briefly–the issue of mapping
and analyzing the mechanics of terrorist networks. It is essential for
counterterrorism organizations to unravel the web of connections
between terrorist branches and cells. Although services are certainly
making the swiftest possible progress in that respect, there are hardly
any comprehensive studies available. Alternatively, to be fair, there are
considerably less of them than those investigating the stages of lone
radicalization and the options for preventing it.
After 9/11, renowned researcher and hands-on expert on legal social
and institutional networks, Valdis Krebs, attempted to compile the
web of connections between the perpetrators and define the most
typical features of illegal networks.1 Marc Sageman, in his work on terror
networks, points out that we must dispel the common stereotype that
“terrorism is a product of poor, desperate, naïve, single young men from
third world countries, vulnerable to brainwashing and recruitment into
terror.”2 The author illustrates how these elastic and efficient “small-world”
networks form a topology of self-organizing “nodes” and “hubs.” The
communication model of Al-Qaeda was composed of vertical channels
running towards the leadership colonized by horizontally proliferating
nodes and hubs. The terminology may vary, but this model shows distinct
similarities to the model by Krebs and, as we will see, to the real-world
practice of the Islamic State. Krebs draws his conclusion from a 2001
analysis: “To win this fight against terrorism it appears that the good guys
have to build a better information and knowledge sharing network than
the bad guys.”3 This, however, is easier said than done. Even more so,
since in recent years, in respect to the terror attacks carried out by the
Islamic State, the concept of the “lone wolf” overshadowed the network
aspect in terrorism-related public debate and even expert analysis.

LONE WOLVES?
In light of the recent devastating terror attacks on Europe, the main
question is whether the seemingly solitary perpetrators actually acted
alone. Is it possible that, in the majority of these cases, the investigation
came to a halt when, after a major attack, it failed to unravel the chain
of actors through which the perpetrator received communications and
logistics support? Illegal networks naturally follow different principles
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1668
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from those guiding legally operating institutional-social matrices. Yet
the majority of this information is barely available to researchers. Krebs
basically worked from journals, archives, and courtroom records–with the
caveat that a piece of data is considered legitimate only if it is confirmed
by at least two reliable sources.4
On August 21, 2015, on the Thalys TGV en route to Paris, 25-year-old
Moroccan Ayoub El Khazzani opened fire on the passengers, wounding
one of them severely with a knife. Besides the Kalashnikov, the attacker
carried a semi-automatic handgun and a bottle of gasoline. American
soldiers who happened to be travelling on the train subdued him. Even
though the perpetrator, upon returning to Europe from Syria, appeared
on the radar of several services as a dangerous radicalist, his movements
were not under strict surveillance. In his defense, he claimed that he had
been starving and homeless in Belgium, he had only wanted to rob the
train, and he had found the weapons in a park. Authorities conducting
the proceedings were accused of disregarding the presumption of
innocence. Even official statements failed to confirm the attacker’s
connection to Jihadist terrorist organizations. “Right now, we can only
establish remote connections between Khazzani and the Islamic State
or its operative elements. What we know, however, is that he arrived in
Europe simultaneously with Abdelhamid Abaaoud,” said Jean-Charles
Brisard, head of the Paris Centre d’Analyse du Terrorism (CAT), even
though his comprehensive study, published in the winter of 2016, could
lead one to the polar opposite conclusion.5 Here, with a focus on the
francophone networks, I will build on his and his co-author’s data-rich
work in attempting to demonstrate the strong ties between the seemingly
solitary Thalys attacker, Abaaoud (a key figure in the Paris and Brussels
attacks) and, via Abaaoud, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)
high command itself.
Were the ties actually as weak as acting authorities may have believed
at first and even second sight? We need not go farther than CAT’s own
database, which Jean-Charles Brisard and his co-author, Kevin Jackson,
used in their work. This study uses data partially based on information
received from the Hungarian Counter Terrorism Centre and draws on the
rich collection of terrorist profiles compiled by Emma Webb and Robert
Sutton.6 All we have to do is collect publicly available data, examine details,
which may seem unimportant at first, and connect the dots to gain a clear
understanding of the strong ties between the aforementioned actors.
El Khazzani arrives in Hungary via the Balkan refugee route in the summer
of 2015, as shown by the records of the Hungarian Counter Terrorism
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Centre. His friend and fellow fighter Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who was a
head of the ISIS command for external operations in Syria, also arrived
back in Europe disguised as an asylum-seeker. Abaaoud was not only a
strategist and perpetrator of the terror attack on the Bataclan Theatre in
Paris, but for a long time, a supervisor for various operative terror cells
and a liaison between francophone units and the leadership in Syria. In
addition, Khazzani had connections to a Bilal Chatra from Algeria, who
also entered the registry in Hungary, and followed orders by Abaaoud
in June-July to survey the Balkan route, the level of border control and
possibilities for illegal entry. On his way, Chatra keeps informing Abaaoud
and El Khazzani of waiting times and potential paths. They launch small
groups of terrorists disguised as refugees. Abaaoud and El Khazzani stay
at the same hotel in Budapest in early August, only to part ways on the
4th and depart Hungary in different directions. The terrorists stay at hotels
nearby the Eastern Railway Station. Abdeslam found accommodation
at a Rákóczi Street apartment, Hotel 30, while three of his companions,
including another Bataclan attacker, Mohamed-Aggad, spent seven days
at Hotel Central King under falsified documents issued for Jamal Salah,
Fooad Moosa, and Husein Alkhlf. Abaaoud and El Khazzani, who arrived
together, stayed at Swing Hotel Budapest.
Following our network approach, it is advisable to look into, as much as
possible, Abdelhamid Abaaoud’s background story. Naturally, this study
uses only information known to the services and available for public
research. The data helps us draw–although with numerous white spots
remaining–the network which shows us how many steps, how many links
actually separated these assumedly solitary, isolated perpetrators from
the central command of ISIS.
As we know from several sources, in Syria, 2013, a brigade emerged
within the ISIS operative center for organizing attacks on Europe with the
aim of uniting various groups of French and Belgian radicalists into the
Katibat al-Muhajireen, or Muhajireen Brigade (KAM). Its members lived
and fought in the same units. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
built its external ISIS operations on such strong personal ties that often
originated in Europe instead of Syria. Many of them were members of
the same cell at home, and many were preparing for their return from the
moment they arrived, and therefore stayed away from social media. The
first commander of KAM came from the same “gateway group,” Sharia
4, as Abaaoud or Najim Laachraoui, bombmaker of the Paris attacks and
bomber of Zaventem Airport. 7
Abaaoud was the liaison between the ISIS command in Syria and the
Verviers network (named after a small French town), the members of
which returned to Europe via Turkey and Greece in 2014. This was the
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1668
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first widespread network equipped with a safe house, weapons, and
chemicals. Two of its members participated in establishing the training
center in Sabratha, Libya, together with Abaaoud and ISIS spokesperson,
later supreme commander, and al-Adnani. Incidentally, this was also the
unit, which gave the attackers of the Bardo National Museum and Sousse
Beach in Tunisia.
How many steps do we need to take us from seemingly solitary El
Khazzani to al-Adnani? We need exactly one: Abaaoud himself. According
to Belgian courtroom records, Zaventem Airport was originally a
target for the Verviers cell (even though Ibrahim El Bakraoui and Najim
Laachraoui carried the attack out one year later). El Bakraoui faced
charges as early as 2010 for firing an AK-47 assault rifle at a police officer.
The final planning phase of the Brussels attack may have gained speed
when police arrested Abdeslam.8 Yet the fact that one of the mobile
phones used by Abaaoud in Greece contained sketches of a bomber
pushing a trolley with the captions ‘Zaventem’ and ‘Arrival’ indicates that
selecting the target itself was far from a blind or rushed decision.
Among the highest-ranking commanders of external ISIS operations was
Belgian-born Abu Ahmad (also known as Osama Atar). He is a veteran
Jihadist, former training officer from Rakka with multiple prison sentences,
who, after his release due to a robust media campaign, travelled to
Syria. He is the one whom testimonies refer to as “the coordinator of
refugees.” He is a cousin of the Brussels attackers, the Bakraoui brothers.
He is mostly responsible for logistics, such as providing the departing
operatives with false documents. The person overseeing the infrastructure
of external operative units is Abu al-Faransi, a former member of the
French Foreign Legion and an active participant in public beheadings.
Another one of Abaaoud’s friends was the attacker of the Brussels
Jewish Museum, Mehdi Nemmouche, who was widely considered a “lone
wolf” until his connection to Abaaoud was unveiled. When Nemmouche
arrived in Syria in December 2012, Abaaoud was already in charge of the
KAM. Similarly to Zaventem bomber and Paris bombmaker Laachraoui,
Nemmouche previously worked for the ISIS secret service, Amniyat, and
in Aleppo, they were both involved in guarding and assumedly abusing or
even murdering Western and local prisoners.
Nemmouche departed for Europe together with a certain Ibrahim
Boudina. A member of the so-called Cannes-Torcy cell, Boudina travelled
to Syria in 2012 and returned to France in 2014 equipped with a bombmaking manual, a contact list, instructions for secret communications
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and extensive funds. Before his arrest in France, his primary targets were
the Charlie Hebdo office and Nice. He did not carry out either event. The
Kouachi brothers perpetrated the former, members of an operative cell,
which sent three fighters to Falluja in 2004, when the city was under
the command of al-Qaeda leader at the time, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
In prison, Cherif Kouachi built strong ties with some key figures of the
European al-Qaeda network. Among them was Djamel Beghal, who was
preparing to attack the Paris US Embassy in 2001. Beghal’s mentor was
Abu Hamza al-Masri, who had recruited Richard Reid, the infamous shoe
bomb attacker as well as 9/11 conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui. In prison,
Kouachi also met Amedy Coulibaly, perpetrator of Hypercacher Kosher
Supermarket massacre, who was also planning attacks on Paris Jewish
schools. They later travelled together to visit Beghal in Murat. Incidentally,
the Charlie Hebdo attackers had been on the USA surveillance list for
years, as there was reliable intelligence on their al-Qaeda training in
Yemen.9 The investigation following the Nice terrorist attack revealed
that the attacker, Mohamed Bouhlel, had received communications from
the Kouachi brothers earlier. The French Minister of the Interior later
referred to Bouhlel as a “quickly radicalized, solitary perpetrator,” who
was turned radical by his divorce and financial difficulties. An article in
British newspaper The Telegraph published a similar description. On
NBC News, the Paris prosecutor claimed that there was no evidence that
Bouhlel had had direct contact with any terrorist organizations. Later, it is
learned that Bouhlel had been to Tunisia several times – the last occasion
was only eight months prior to the Nice attack–where one single link, a
mutual fellow combatant separated him from the Tunis commander of the
al-Nusra Front.
Walid Hamam arrives in Greece as a Syrian “refugee.” Before that,
in Lebanon, he is a member of the same unit as al-Adnani. A further
co-combatant is Mohamed-Aggad, one of the attackers of Bataclan.
Mohamed-Aggad arrives in Hungary on 9 September. There, he meets
Abdeslam, who, as we know, has made four rounds between Syria and
Europe, three of them through Hungary. Abdeslam collects the Paris
attackers in Budapest and the small Hungarian village of Kiskörös.
We can see that these francophone perpetrators belonged to operative
cells that had returned from Syria and had received their training
from KAM. Which is not to say that their difficult childhood or family
background could not have contributed to their internal process of
radicalization. However, from a counterterrorism perspective this has
no bearing on the fact that not one of these combatants fits the profile
of a “lone wolf”–neither is it true that local Islamist cells or communities
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1668
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recruited or radicalized them. None of them was further away from ISIS
command and control than one link in the chain.
Nevertheless, we should also take a closer look at the Berlin attack of
December 2016 from this aspect.10 The perpetrator, Anis Amri, flees
Tunisia after a successful escape from prison, and arrives in Europe in
April 2011. He is 19 at the time, but he claims he is 16. In the refugee camp
in Sicily, he threatens to decapitate Christians, attacks an aid worker, and
commits arson. Even though he is prosecuted, Tunisian authorities send,
him travel documents and the Italians release him in June 2015. Yet Amri
does not return to Tunisia but heads north to Switzerland only to later
enter Germany under an assumed name. He steals, attacks a security
guard and yet he walks away. In November, German counterintelligence
informant VP01 reports that Amri has joined a cell under the leadership
of the German ISIS commander, Iraqi Abu Walaa, and is preparing to
buy a Kalashnikov. He has connections to Abu Walaa (also known as
Ahmad Abdullah) through a Serbian-German citizen called Simeonovic,
headmaster of the school where Amri studies as a refugee. The informant
also reports that Amri is preparing for a terrorist attack. He is now under
surveillance, including monitoring his conversations. He travels to Berlin,
but in order to protect their source, the Germans decide to wait. After the
attack, the press–with no or only belated rebuttal from the authorities–
refers to Amri as a non-religious, non-fanatic refugee who was radicalized
in prison. However, if we connect the data provided by various sources,
we can see at least two remarkable things. The operative cell, which Amri
belongs to, has a link through a certain Abu Hanifa to the European chief
of operations, Abaaoud. Moreover, Amri’s cousin, a member of Tunisian
ISIS, maintains regular correspondence with Amri through the encrypted
application Telegram–even before Amri goes to prison.
One of the perpetrators of the terror attack on the Bardo National
Museum in Tunis, which claimed 22 victims, landed in Sicily as a refugee.
The German police arrested the other one, but have not released his
name. What we know is that he lived in Germany between 2003 and
2013, and he returned there five months after the attack, in August 2015
as an asylum-seeker. Both he and the perpetrator of the beach attack
in Sousse with 38 fatalities received training at the Sabratha camp, the
financing of which Abaaoud organized. We can therefore assume at least
an indirect contact between Abaaoud and the Tunisian attackers. We
should also add that, even though Abaaoud was a key figure in organizing
and executing foreign operations, later interrogation and courtroom
records show that he was always awaiting orders from two Tunisian
commanders. One of them was Abu al-Tunisi, also known as “emir of the
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foreigners,” commander of the foreign fighters, who was also named as
the operative officer by the intended perpetrator of a thwarted attack
on Dusseldorf. Due to source protection, Abaaoud’s other superior has
never been named. Although the Sabratha camp may connect Abaaoud
to the Tunisian perpetrators, the data available suggests that here, unlike
on the map of the European attacks, he was not on the vertical axis of the
network connecting ISIS high command to the operative cells. In terms of
the Tunisian terror operations, Abaaoud appears to be a horizontal–that is,
indirect–connection.
Ben Hassine, founder of the Tunisian branch of ISIS, may have recruited
Seifeddine Rezgui, the gunman of the attack on the Sousse beach, who
was killed on the spot. In the 90s, Ben Hassine lived in the UK and found
a mentor in Abu Qatada, whose role the British High Court of Justice
described as the intellect behind the operation, who had his “watermark”
on every detail. Abu Qatada’s name will later resurface in connection
with the attack on Manchester Arena. The other commander, according
to statements made by arrested operatives, was a certain Chamseddine
al-Sandi, leader of a terrorist cell, which had a vital role in both attacks in
Tunisia. Rezgui organized his meetings with the members of the cell in cafés
and mosques. One of them in the Sabratha ISIS camp also trained him.
The bomber of the Manchester Arena, 22-year-old Salman Ramadan
Abedi arrived in the UK with his family as refugees of the Gaddafi regime.
In 2011, his father and one of his brothers returned to Libya, where the
services listed them as radical Islamists. His younger brother Hashim
received charges for organizing a terror attack, maintaining contact with
Salman, and having prior knowledge of the plans for the Manchester
bombing. Libyan authorities reported that the brothers had a 15-minute
phone conversation immediately before the attack. According to German
police, Abedi returned to Manchester via Istanbul and Dusseldorf Airport.
In the preceding days, as the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
reports, Abedi travelled to Sabratha in order to meet operatives of Katibat
al-Battar al-Libi, the local ISIS terrorist unit. The same unit trained some of
the Paris perpetrators and–as we have seen–the Sousse gunman as well.11
The planning phase is likely to have commenced earlier: Abedi opened
a bank account in May 2016, which he used, among other items, for
financing the preparation of his TATP explosive. At the same time, there
were reports of him visiting hardware and gardening supply stores.
Immediately after the bombing, police statements suggested that
the attacker was highly likely to have been acting alone. An article in
The Guardian speculated that Abedi was not a Jihadist but a vodkahttps://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1668
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intoxicated teenager. It soon became clear, however, that the Jihadist
network operating in Manchester has its roots in Libya and Syria. Official
sources said that Abedi was just a “mule,” a transporter, while someone
else prepared the IED.12 French and British intelligence sources were
leaked to the media claiming that Abedi had been to Syria, where he had
connections to the Islamic State.13 Among his connections, it is worth
noting Manchester university student Raphael Hostey, who recruited
hundreds of Brits convincing them to fight for ISIS.14 Besides Hostey–
who left his family in 2013 to join ISIS, where he gained name for himself
as Abu Qaqa– British journal The Telegraph gives Abedi’s network a
comprehensive analysis.15 His friends included Abdalraouf Abdallah, who
arrived in Manchester as a refugee, and who later received a sentence of
five and a half years in prison for aiding former Iraq veteran Stephen Grey
(who had also spent years in prison for terrorist activities) in travelling to
Syria. After being shot and confined to a wheelchair in 2011, Grey lived in
Abedi’s neighborhood in Manchester.
The network also included Ronald Fiddler, also known as Jamal al-Harith,
who joined ISIS in 2014 and died in 2017, when he drove a truck full of
explosives into a Mosul army base. He also received a large compensation
payout after his release from Guantanamo in the early 2000s. Another
noteworthy Manchester operative was Abd al-Baset Azzouz, who left
Manchester behind to build his own terrorist network in Libya with the
guidance of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the current leader of al-Qaeda. 48-yearold expert bombmaker Azzouz had 200-300 fighters under his command.
According to a high-ranking Washington official, intelligence sources
suggested that Abedi had contact with Libyan Imam Abdul Baset Ghwela,
famous for his radical line, whose son died as an ISIS fighter. Counterterrorism expert Raffaello Pantucci believes that the al-Qaeda-affiliated
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group consisted of combatants who travelled
from Manchester to Libya as foreign fighters to join the uprising against
Gaddafi. Later, some returned to the UK, forming the “British arm,” while
others travelled on to Syria.16 However, the radical Imam Abu Qatada,
who arrived in the UK in 1993 with false identification, and served several
prison sentences, also affected Abedi. Authorities arrested him in 2001
for the preparations of a bombing at the Strasbourg Christmas Fair–not
that that was only terrorist activity he may have pursued. Still, for more
than a decade, it was impossible to deport him from the UK due to
several rulings by the European Court of Human Rights. According to an
article in The Times, the imam was also an advisor to known terrorists
such as Zacarias Moussaoui and Richard Reid, whose names–though only
indirectly–we have already mentioned in connection with the Charlie
Hebdo gunmen. Later, in 9/11 organizer Mohamed Atta’s apartment,
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Abu Qatada’s video was also found. Qatada underwent interrogation in
February 2001, nearly half a year before 9/11. During a search, authorities
found £170,000 in his home with £805 in a separate envelope inscribed
“for the Mujahideen in Chechnya.”17
Regarding communications preceding the Manchester attack, it is worth
noting how–besides Telegram and other less frequented encrypted
applications–Abedi received additional support through Zello. This
application had played a part earlier in the Istanbul attack on Reina Disco,
although the primary communication channel of that operation had
been Telegram. The design of Zello combines social media features with
telephone and radio functions. It is available on smartphones, tablets and
computers, and–a considerable advantage in certain regions–it operates
reliably on low battery settings. Some messages suggest that organization
of the Manchester bombing commenced as early as nine months before
the attack.
The FBI gained access to encrypted segments implying that Abedi had
online communication with Syrian and US-based radicals, asking for
advice on details such as the backpack for carrying the device. Authorities
apprehended two other participants of these clandestine conversations
weeks before the attack. In one such message, Abedi inquired,
“Sheikh, I live in Manchester, in Great Britain. I live among non-Muslims.
I have found work with them. Am I allowed to kill them? Is it permitted
to kill them with a bomb?” The unidentified sheikh, who may have been
an ISIS operative from Syria, responded citing the Quran: “Fight the
pagans all together.” Another correspondent, US citizen Said Azzam
Mohamad Rahim allegedly advised: “To the boy from Manchester I say,
OK, kill them! Show no mercy to civilians.” 18
Later, authorities arrested Rahim in Texas trying to board a flight to Jordan.
Neither can we consider the Uzbek perpetrators of the attacks on St
Petersburg and Stockholm “lone wolves.” Akbarson Dalilov, who killed 16
and wounded 49 in the St Petersburg subway on April 3, 2017, received
his Russian citizenship in 2011. In 2013, he attempted to travel to Syria
via Turkey, but Turkish authorities arrested and deported him back to
Russia. The 8-member operative cell he belonged to is likely to have been
only a fragment of the 4000 radicals from Russia and the 5000 from
the post-Soviet countries who have–based on Russian estimates–joined
ISIS.19 Numerous fighters travelled to Syria from Kyrgyzstan’s secondlargest city, Osh. As an officer in charge of the investigation told Russian
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1668
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newspaper Kommersant, Dzalilov may have been under the influence
of a Syrian terrorist cell recruiting Uzbek nationals. The FSB arrested
his training supervisor, Abror Azimov, after the attack. Four days later,
Rakhamat Akilov, another Uzbek terrorist, who was also planning to join
ISIS and was similarly deported back to Sweden by Turkish authorities in
2015, drove a beer truck into a crowd, killing five. In his bag that he kept in
the truck, police also found an explosive device.

MAPPING NETWORKS
We can see how, in a certain sense, it is possible to pinpoint the Jihadist
network model in the strategy of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.
The network structure behind the recent, devastating European terrorist
attacks exhibits unmistakable similarities to those characterizing 9/11 and
other al-Qaeda operations, thoroughly researched by Krebs et al. We can
clearly see the significance of early childhood connections or a shared
area of living (which was most pronounced in the case of French cells).
Similarly, to Mohammed Atta, who played a central role in the preparation
of 9/11 by connecting minor cells to each other and to bin Laden, in this
case Abdelhamid Abaaoud acted as a coordinator and liaison towards
ISIS high command in the framework of almost all above-mentioned
terrorist attacks. (Citing Abdeslam as the key figure stems from confusing
his actual role in the network with the proportion of media coverage he
received–due to the simple fact that police captured him alive. Otherwise,
he was only responsible for logistics.) Blatant discrepancies and conflicts
between al-Qaeda and ISIS (with the underlying disagreements between
the Sunni “elite” and Sunni “proletariat”) may cause us to overlook the
continuity and similarities in their methods. It is interesting to note that
the network of the extremist left terrorist, Carlos, directed from Budapest
between 1979 and 1984, showed a different structure.20
Often a city, town, or neighborhood serves as a network node for building
personal chains spanning entire decades. A much-cited example, the
Brussels district of Molenbeek became the focus of terrorist activity well
before the 2016 Paris and Brussels attacks. Molenbeek was home, for
instance, to the operatives who, disguising themselves as journalists,
committed the assassination of Afghan Taliban commander Ahmed
Shah Massoud ordered by bin Laden two days prior to 9/11. The two
perpetrators of the 2004 Madrid bombings, which claimed 192 lives, were
also Molenbeek residents.21 Some al-Qaeda veterans, who lived there,
helped the ISIS-generation in traveling to Syria. Belgium, as a potential
and desired target, already appeared in the al-Qaeda related documents
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published by the West Point CTC. In one of the Sinjar documents, a certain
Husayn mentions Belgium in his letter of 11 August 2007 as his destination,
and he is already planning financing and network building:
“As for the operations in Europe, I [the author / Husayn] have
some [communication] lines. I even have someone that can take
over and complete the work of Abu-‘Abdallah al-Baljiki [the
Belgium]. Additionally, there is another person who works with
me in gathering the funds over there. There are many brothers
over there who want to work, however, over here, where you are,
or in over there in Europe, if Abu-Qasurah wants to give me the
addresses, I will call them. When I arrive, I can explain and clarify
the matter better.”22
Such disappearance and reemergence of strategic-operative details under
one guise/in one region or another may create the impression that they are
particular to a specific era or organization. As an example, while AQI, the
Iraq branch of al-Qaeda had some of their attacks carried out by women in
the mid-2000s to intensify the psychological effect, there were indications
in the last year that ISIS was also shifting towards female perpetrators.23
Expert views suggest that terrorist networks may be revived and
reinforced in South Asia and Central-Asia, the former Soviet republics, and
Libya. On Uygur terrorism, we have fairly limited public information. What
we know is that the attacker of the Reina Disco in Istanbul, the Uzbek
Masharipov received instructions from Rakka, but also had support from
an Uzbek-Uygur cell from Anatolya, which was already preparing the plot
for a second, similar attack.24 We know even less of the fact that “Uygur
terrorist activities exist outside of the borders of China.”25 In Europe, some
experts predict, returning “foreign fighters” may add to the numbers
of radical Islamists posing a threat. Detailed review of these trends is,
however, outside the scope of this article.
Krebs, and others, drew the map of terrorist networks primarily with
regard to operative cells. For a more comprehensive view, we should
also consider a different system of layers one that is significantly
more difficult to pinpoint since it is integrated loosely, flexibly, and
colorfully into society than operative units or the central core of terrorist
organizations. In expert circles, there is increasing focus given to socalled “virtual plotters”: master planners who design terrorist attacks
through online correspondence. Police only later tied ISIS-member
Rachid Kassim to two operations that they had thought were the actions
of isolated perpetrators. Through his Telegram channel Sabre de Lumiere
(Sabre of Light), he conducted more than half of the seventeen thwarted
attacks in France, 2016.26
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We know little about the networks used by the Islamic State to sell
oil, natural gas, or phosphate. It is also a question how, through what
network of intermediaries they could find buyers globally for the valuable
artifacts they also sold illegally for profit. We must therefore consider
the peculiar interdependence and convergence between international
organized crime and terrorist organizations–an issue that is too massive
to tackle on these pages.
If our investigation concerns the present rather than the past, it is usually
near impossible to provide detailed and unquestionable evidence of a
state’s involvement in terrorism. A demonstrative example of the layered
and overlapping nature of networks is apparent in the production and
distribution of the drug Captagon.27 Both Abdeslam and one of the
Tunis attackers may have been under the influence of this medication
that, besides its analgesic, disinhibitory, and euphorizing effects, has
the rare impact of triggering extreme and wild behavior. The Islamic
State of Iraq and the Levant fighters commonly use it. Manufacturing
counterfeit Captagon began in Hezbollah-operated Lebanese laboratories
with considerable Iranian funding. In 2014, authorities confiscated 55
million counterfeit pills in Lebanon, while they estimated the amount
in circulation to be ten times that. Hezbollah and its leaders made
tremendous profit through the illegal production of Captagon. Iran, on
the other hand, supported this Hezbollah enterprise for purely political
reasons: For them, the investment was a means of non-linear warfare
(NLW). “Unlike the conventional definitions of hybrid warfare, NLW
includes the infocommunicative, social and social-psychological toolsets
that belligerents utilize indirectly, often through intermediaries and
external agents, in a variety of ‘“battlefields.’”28 Schauffer’s demonstration
of NLW focuses primarily on Russia’s distinctive methods of engagement.
His microanalysis fits perfectly into István Resperger’s observations on
asymmetric warfare:
“Careful analysis of the military conflict between Russia and
Ukraine shows how Russians (partly due to international backlash
and sanctions) mobilize their armed forces in “waves:” in close
coordination with directly and indirectly planned operations
and activities, but in small contingents. Success is the sum of
“minor victories,” and the final outcome is the triumph of the
comprehensive strategy.”29
The profit gained by the Shiite Iranian government from funding Captagon
production was, in the long term, not financial but political: mentally
weakening the Sunni population and destabilizing Sunni states. The
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cooperation of terrorist organizations and states supporting terrorism is
often rooted in bizarre or paradoxical motives: the principle of “the enemy
of my enemy” is just one example. As Balázs Laufer pointed out in his
highly nuanced analysis of the connection between the migration wave
and the international terror threat:
“[...] immigrant groups tend to retain their (ethnic/religious/tribal)
conflicts in the receiving country; that is, the migration of conflicts
occurs parallel to that of humans. [...] This situation may result in
a conflict of interests between foreign secret services or criminal
organizations in the receiving country (such as a potential clash
between Turkish and Kurdish immigrants in Germany).”30
From a network aspect, this means that counter-intelligence operatives
may often face a chain of connections that has direct links to terrorist cells
or radical Muslim communities, which, instead of their true purpose, may
initiate contact under “false flags.” The network map should also include
NGOs acting as umbrella organizations and, under the guise of humanitarian
objectives, helping terrorist operations transfer funds, spread propaganda,
or exert psychological pressure. These units also have connections to each
other through distinctive ties. One example of the “umbrella” model of
these NGOs was the well-known case of the ship Mavi Marmara (also known
as the Flottila) in 2011, when Palestinian terrorists tried to enter the Gazadistrict under the cover of multiple “humanitarian” organizations.31

BREAKING DOWN THE NSS:
Other peculiarities and redundancies are difficult to interpret. While
propaganda targets potential “lone wolves” with its instructions, we
have seen that all major European attacks were planned and carried out
by operatives who had direct contact to the ISIS external operations
command. It is hardly beneficial for secure preparation and conspiring
if the organization publicly announces the target or the intended device
prior to the attack–and yet that was exactly what happened in numerous
cases. As pointed out by László Simon, in this case “indirect threats in the
cyberspace have a negative effect on conducting traditional operations.”32
On Rumiyach, the Islamist forum replacing Dabiq, there was a piece on
November 7, 2016, weeks before the Berlin attack, which advised “lone
wolves” to carry out truck ramming attacks, discussing the advantages,
recommending vehicles to use, targets to choose. At the time of its
publication, Anis Amri was already busy preparing for his ramming attack.
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Earlier, on the Telegram channel “Orlando” opened after the Orlando
terrorist attack, authors specifically named Berlin as the city they advised
“lone wolves” to target with their hits. In 2016, many ISIS followers
shared the news that the next attack was likely to be in Berlin.33 After the
successful operation, the propaganda for solitary attackers intensified. A
Facebook user named Sufyan al-Khayyati addresses them with the words
“Kill them, slaughter them, trample them, burn them, kick them, and use all
means to kill the crusaders, whether they are civilians or military personnel
[...].”34 Three days before the attack on Bardo Museum, one ISIS group in
Tunis announced “glad tidings of what will bring you joy and bring joy to
the Muslims in general,” while another group issued a similarly ominous
announcement “interpreted as foreshadowing” the attack.35
Another example would be the attack near Würzburg, Germany on 18 July
2016: the attacker, 17-year-old Riaz Khan Ahmadzai shouted “Allah Akbar,”
and attacked five people with a knife and an axe, causing two of them
life-threatening wounds. In a two and a half minute video made before the
attack, he is holding a knife and threatening to hit “every city, town, and
airport.” Although he arrived in Germany as an Afghan refugee, he was
later thought to be older and from Pakistan. The press tended to refer
to him as a lone radical perpetrator, while the German Interior Minister
Thomas de Maiziere said his act was “perhaps half-way between running
amok and terror.”36 However, there have been findings that contradicted
this statement. Before the attack, Ahmadzai had contact with the Islamic
State, and sent his video for approval to the ISIS secret service, the Amnal-Khajri (Amniyat). The Caliphate news agency Amaq had published the
video where Ahmadzai introduces himself as Muhammad Riyad, soldier
of ISIS. Based on the recording acquired by the Long War Journal, Kyle
Orton, a researcher for the London-based Centre for the Response to
Radicalization and Terrorism published a transcript of the conversations
between Ahmadzai and an ISIS intelligence officer:
“[T]he Islamic State’s man asked: ‘What kind of weapons do you
intend to use to kill people?’ ‘My knife and axe are ready for use,’
Khan replied. ‘Brother, would it not be better to do it with a car?’
the Islamic State plotter asked … ‘The damage would be much
greater,’ he told Khan. But Khan was impatient, saying he ‘cannot
drive’ and ‘learning takes time.’ ‘I want to enter paradise tonight,’
Khan explained.” [...] Ahmadzai was in contact with IS’s intelligence
officer right up to the moment he began his terrorist attack. ‘Pray
that I become a martyr,’ Ahmadzai wrote. ‘I am now waiting for the
train.’ Shortly afterwards, Ahmadzai sent another message: ‘I am
starting now.’ The Amn al-Kharji operative responded: ‘Now you
will attain paradise.’”37
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CONCLUSION
However far-fetched it may sound, a hypothesis to consider is the
possibility that announcing and adopting a strategy with lone perpetrators
in the forefront may serve a double purpose as diversive propaganda:
spreading fear and insecurity among civilians and misleading police and
intelligence forces. This psychological operation is part of large-scale
psychological warfare. Thus, feeding the legend of the “lone wolf” is
probably a means of asymmetric warfare with the aim of maintaining
control, keeping the enemy in the dark and provoking reactions.
The media, experts and politicians–including Europol and President
Obama–for years claimed that the “lone wolf” posed the utmost security
threat. However, Marc Trevidic, France’s chief counter-terrorism judge
made the intriguing statement after his retirement that lone wolf attacks
were used as a “smoke screen” that “served to put all our agencies on
edge” and “allowed them to calmly prepare.” He also warned that while
these attacks distract security forces, terrorist organizations are planning
“huge atrocities” across Europe.38
On a final note, it is apparent how the legend of the “lone wolf” as a
terrorist propaganda device in the service of psychological warfare has
become pervasive in European media. It could not have reached so
many and become so widely adopted without the aid of political and
civilian groups in desperate search for narratives to diminish the threats
associated with the increasing waves of illegal migration.
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